
Between 2020 and 2021, BC Housing spent $202.4 million acquiring nine hotels across British Columbia to shelter people experiencing homelessness, $150 to $153 million of that on five properties in Vancouver alone. One of those properties, the former Howard Johnson Hotel on Granville Street, cost $56.6 million once all expenses were counted and has since generated close to 4,000 police calls, 900 fire department responses, and over 200 floods into a ground-floor commercial tenant. The province is now closing that building and, as of July 2026, has launched a disposal process governed by a non-disclosure agreement that keeps the eventual sale or lease price, and possibly the outcome itself, out of public view. This is occurring against a backdrop of a $13.3 billion provincial deficit, new taxes taking effect in late 2026, and a rewritten seniors’ property tax deferment program whose new interest terms can, over two decades, consume more home equity in interest than the deferred taxes themselves.
The five Vancouver properties together account for roughly $150 to $153 million of the total spend. For context on valuation, the Patricia Hotel had been assessed by BC Assessment at $14.2 million before the province paid $62 million for it, more than four times the assessed value.The five Vancouver properties together account for roughly $150 to $153 million of the total spend. For context on valuation, the Patricia Hotel had been assessed by BC Assessment at $14.2 million before the province paid $62 million for it, more than four times the assessed value.
The province’s defense of these prices rests on independent appraisals, which the Auditor General found came in only modestly above the amounts actually paid: $220 million appraised against $202.4 million paid. The mechanics of those appraisals are worth understanding. They were commissioned by, and addressed to, BC Housing itself as the purchasing party, not ordered by an independent mortgage lender, since these were cash transactions with no financing institution requiring its own valuation. Policy required only that the appraisal’s valuation date fall within one year of the purchase and sale agreement; the Auditor General’s report does not specify whether appraisals were finalized before or after price negotiations concluded. The audit found no compliance violations, but it also did not examine appraiser independence or the methodology behind the figures.

The Howard Johnson building, now operated under the name “Luugat,” has generated close to 4,000 police calls and approximately 900 fire department responses since the province took possession in mid-2020. A ground-floor nightclub has flooded more than 200 times, which the building’s operator attributes to burst pipes and hoarding conditions inside residential units. The Patricia Hotel was separately the site of a fatal police shooting in 2022.
Facing sustained pressure from neighbouring businesses, BC Housing announced in November 2025 that it will close the Howard Johnson/Luugat building by the end of June 2026 and relocate its remaining roughly 110 residents.
The 2026 disposal process
For much of 2025, BC Housing had disclosed no sale or lease terms and had not confirmed whether the property would be sold, leased, or redeveloped. That changed on July 24, 2026, when BC Housing issued a formal Expression of Interest. The document’s introduction states its purpose directly: “This Expression of Interest (‘EOI’) is issued by BC Housing Management Commission (‘BC Housing’) to invite the public to submit an expression of interest for leasing or purchasing a hotel property located in Vancouver, British Columbia (‘the Province’).”
The background section describes a hotel with two Commercial Retail Units, acquired in 2020 and operated as supportive housing for six years, a description that matches the Howard Johnson/Luugat building.

How the process is structured
Step 1: The non-disclosure agreement. No substantive information about the property is released before a prospective respondent signs and submits Appendix E, a non-disclosure agreement. Appendix B (Information and Requirements) and Appendix D (Property Operation Plan) are both marked in the EOI as “will be provided upon NDA submission.” Section 4 states that “no submission will be accepted from respondents who do not submit the signed NDA.” Before signing, the only publicly available materials are the EOI cover document, the submission form, and the blank NDA itself. The NDA’s confidentiality term runs five years, with trade secret provisions running indefinitely. The signed-NDA deadline was July 30, 2026, 2:00 p.m. Pacific.
Step 2: The site package. Once the NDA is executed, BC Housing releases the Information and Requirements (Appendix B) and Property Operation Plan (Appendix D), covering site specifics, service requirements, and operating expectations.
Step 3: Submission. Respondents submit a completed submission form (Appendix A) and a summary of commercial or hotel property management experience over the preceding five years (Appendix C), by email only, to BC Housing’s named contact, by the final deadline.

BC Housing characterizes this EOI as a non-binding, information-gathering exercise intended to gauge interest and shortlist candidates, not a competitive process with a guaranteed outcome. From any resulting shortlist, BC Housing may run a further negotiated procurement, or bypass that step entirely and negotiate directly with a party of its choosing, including one that never responded to the EOI.
Transparency limitations in the disposal process
Several provisions in the EOI and NDA merit attention, not as evidence of impropriety, but because they explain why so little about this transaction is likely to become public at any stage.
This is not a formal competitive bid process. The EOI states it is “not intended to be a formal legally binding ‘Contract A’ bidding process,” the legal structure that typically obligates a public buyer to treat all bidders fairly and consistently, and that gives an unsuccessful bidder standing to challenge the process. Without it, BC Housing bears no obligation to run this as an open competition.
BC Housing retains the right to bypass the process entirely. Section 2.2 reserves BC Housing’s right to negotiate with firms that never responded to the EOI, to contact only a limited subset of respondents, to open a wider solicitation later, or to decline to sell or lease the property at all. In practical terms, this EOI functions closer to market sounding than a sale process, and the eventual counterparty need not be a respondent to it.
No price is established at this stage. The EOI describes any pricing discussed as “for general information purposes only.” A binding figure, if one is ever reached, is set later in a separate agreement that this EOI does not require to be disclosed.

BC Housing does not warrant the accuracy of its own disclosures. Section 2.4 states that BC Housing and its advisers “make no representation, warranty or guarantee as to the accuracy of the information” provided, describing all figures as estimates. Respondents are instructed to rely on independent due diligence.
Respondents bear their own costs and do not retain their materials. Section 2.5 assigns each party its own costs of participation. Section 2.7 provides that submitted materials become BC Housing’s property and are generally not returned.
The confidentiality obligation extends to the existence of discussions. The NDA’s definition of “Confidential Information” explicitly includes “the fact that discussions or negotiations may be taking place concerning the Potential Transaction.” A signatory cannot confirm even that talks are underway without BC Housing’s written consent, and cannot make public statements, including to media, without the same approval.
Either party may withdraw without liability. Section 14 of the NDA provides that until a fully executed definitive agreement exists, neither party is under any obligation, and either may terminate discussions “without giving rise to any claim for damages or equitable relief.”
Breach of confidentiality carries financial exposure for the respondent. Section 13 is an indemnity clause obligating a respondent to cover BC Housing’s losses, including legal costs, arising from unauthorized disclosure or use of confidential information.
One category of information may surface: respondent identity. Section 2.9 notes BC Housing “may make public the name of all Respondents,” meaning the list of interested parties could eventually be disclosed even where terms and outcomes are not.
This structure is a fairly conventional model for how public agencies run property dispositions, and none of the above is, by itself, evidence of wrongdoing. Collectively, however, it means the public may never learn the final sale or lease price, the terms negotiated, or even whether a transaction occurred, unless BC Housing elects to disclose it or the information is later obtained through a Freedom of Information request.
The signed EOI and NDA documents are included as appendices to this article.

While this property accumulated police and fire responses, the province’s overall fiscal position was deteriorating. British Columbia’s deficit for 2026-27 is projected at $13.3 billion, with no plan in the current budget to eliminate it; the shortfall is projected to remain near $11 billion annually for the balance of the decade.
Several tax measures take effect in 2026 in response. The bottom income tax bracket rises from 5% to 5.6%, an estimated $76 per year for the average British Columbian. The Provincial Sales Tax rate remains at 7%, but its base expands on October 1, 2026, to commissions on non-residential real estate transactions, rental and strata property management services, and professional services including accounting, bookkeeping, architecture, engineering, and geoscience. The speculation and vacancy tax rises to 4%.
Residential property owners face a direct increase through the school tax surcharge on higher-value homes: from 2% to 3% on the portion of assessed value between $3 million and $4 million, and from 4% to 6% on the portion above $4 million. For Vancouver homeowners with five-figure annual property tax bills, this surcharge is likely a meaningful component, and it has just increased.
Concurrent with this spending record, the province also revised the terms of the Property Tax Deferment Program, which has allowed eligible homeowners to defer annual property tax against their home equity for decades.
Under the prior terms, homeowners aged 55 and older, along with people with disabilities and certain families with children, could defer property tax at simple interest of prime minus 2%. At the current prime rate of 4.45%, this equals 2.45% simple interest.
For any amount deferred from 2026 onward, the rate becomes prime plus 2%, compounded monthly: 6.45% at the current prime rate. The change is not limited to the four-point rate differential. Simple interest accrues linearly; compound interest, particularly compounded monthly, accelerates the growth of the balance over time. Under the former terms, a deferred balance would take approximately 28 years to double. Under the revised terms, approximately 11.
Balances deferred before 2026 retain the original prime-minus-2%, simple-interest terms; the revised formula applies only to amounts deferred from 2026 forward.
The Office of the Seniors Advocate of British Columbia has acknowledged concerns about the change while continuing to describe the program as “an important tool to help seniors with low incomes manage rising costs and stay in their homes.” Seniors’ advocacy organizations quoted by the Globe and Mail have argued the revised terms undermine the program’s original intent: a senior deferring taxes over an extended period now surrenders a materially larger share of home equity to interest than under the pre-2026 terms.
The following illustrates the effect using a hypothetical senior deferring $10,000 annually, holding today’s prime rate (4.45%) constant across both formulas and both time horizons. Actual prime rates will fluctuate over such periods; holding the rate constant isolates the effect of the formula change itself.

The material figure is how the ratio of total debt to deferred tax shifts over time. Under the prior program, after 20 years the total owed equals roughly 126% of the amount deferred, principal with a modest interest component. Under the revised program, that figure rises to roughly 210%, meaning accrued interest alone exceeds the total tax ever deferred. This is the structural basis for describing the revised terms as an equity trap for long-term participants: at 6.45% compounding, a deferred balance roughly doubles every 11 years, so a senior deferring taxes over two decades can see interest alone consume more home equity than the underlying tax obligation.
Set the record in order and the pattern is straightforward. In 2020, the province paid $45 million, $56.6 million with all costs included, for a single Granville Street hotel, at a price supported by an appraisal it commissioned itself. Then-Housing Minister Selina Robinson announced the purchase, alongside the Buchan Hotel, as a means of moving people from encampments into “safe, healthy” housing. Over the following six years, the building generated close to 4,000 police calls and 900 fire responses, and flooded a ground-floor commercial tenant more than 200 times. The province is now closing it, through a disposal process that is not required to ever disclose its price or outcome to the public that funded the acquisition.
That single property sits within a larger fiscal picture: a $13.3 billion annual deficit with no stated plan to close it, new taxes reaching residents through an expanded PST base and a higher income tax rate, a school tax surcharge that has increased on higher-value homes, and a seniors’ tax deferral program now charging close to three times the compounding interest it did a year prior. None of these changes were concealed; each was disclosed through budget documents and public filings. Considered together, however, they describe a consistent direction of flow: greater cost borne by residents and fixed-income seniors, alongside large sums committed to a project defended at the time of purchase and now wound down through a process exempt from any requirement to disclose its recovery.
Christine Boyle has served as Minister of Housing and Municipal Affairs, the ministry responsible for BC Housing, since July 2025, and is the minister currently overseeing this closure and disposal process. Questions regarding the eventual sale or lease price, how it compares to the $56.6 million already spent, and why this disposal process carries no requirement to disclose that figure to the public, are appropriately directed to her office and to BC Housing’s public affairs division.
This account does not allege that any individual acted unlawfully. It documents a measurable gap: between what taxpayers paid, what the asset became, what residents are now asked to contribute toward the province’s deficit, and what the public is entitled to learn about where this property goes next. That gap, supported by primary source documents, is the record.
References
• Office of the Auditor General of British Columbia, COVID-19 Response: Property Purchases, March 2022.
• The Tyee, Auditor General Finds No Fault with BC’s Hotel-Buying Spree, March 2022.
• CBC News, B.C. Housing followed rules in buying 9 hotels, auditor general report finds.
• Business in Vancouver, B.C. pays 4.5 times assessed value for Downtown Eastside’s Patricia Hotel.
• Western Investor, B.C. defends $63.8M price for Patricia Hotel.
• Province of British Columbia, Province purchases properties in Vancouver to provide more affordable housing, June 2020.
• Daily Hive, BC government buys two Vancouver hotels to help house homeless.
• Daily Hive, ‘Granville Street is in full crisis’: pleas to shut down unsafe SROs.
• Global News, ‘Incredibly long road’: Granville Howard Johnson supportive housing to close next June.
• Global News, ‘Slum landlord’: Granville bar flood exposes conditions inside BC Housing SRO.
• Global News, Club owners want compensation for repeated damage from Vancouver social housing.
• CBC News, Man dead after police-involved shooting at hotel in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.
• BC Housing, Expression of Interest #1070-2627-091, Lease or Purchase a Hotel Property, Vancouver, BC, issued July 24, 2026 (primary source document, appended).
• BC Housing, Appendix E, Non-Disclosure Agreement, EOI 1070-2627-091 (primary source document, appended).
• Resource Works, Rising deficits and new taxes define the latest B.C. government spending plan.
• Daily Hive, B.C.’s PST will be expanded in 2026, especially for real estate.
• Province of British Columbia, Interest and fees for property tax deferment.
• Globe and Mail, B.C. seniors’ advocates push back on overhaul of property tax deferment program.
• Office of the Seniors Advocate of British Columbia, Update on B.C.’s Property Tax Deferment Program.
• BC Housing, Minister of Housing and Municipal Affairs.
• WOWA, Canada Prime Rate, accessed August 2026.
Matt Gul is a West Vancouver-based real estate advisor and Personal Real Estate Corporation with RE/MAX Masters Realty, specializing in waterfront and luxury properties. His 26-year career spans marketing consulting for European enterprises, brokerage ownership (Alliance First Realty, Coal Harbour), and international investment advisory work in Türkiye, Bulgaria, and Switzerland, including public tender participation and partnership formation. He is a recipient of the RE/MAX Hall of Fame and Chairman’s Awards, and has served as Past President of the Rotary Club of West Vancouver Sunrise and Director of the Vancouver Artillery Association.